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Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great Depression: 
The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic 
By CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS AND JOSEPH R. MASON * 
We examine the social costs of asymmetric-information-induced bank panics in 
an environment without government deposit insurance. Our case study is the 
Chicago bank panic of June 1932. We compare the ex ante characteristics of 
panic failures and panic survivors. Despite temporary confusion about bank asset 
quality on the part of depositors during the panic, which was associated with 
widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines, the panic did not pro- 
duce significant social costs in terms offailures among solvent banks. (JEL G28, 
G21, N22, E58, E32) 
Recent work in banking theory and history 
has helped to define the potential causes and 
costs of bank panics, which various authors 
have argued can be traced to speculative at- 
tacks on the numeraire (Barry A. Wigmore, 
1987; R. Glenn Donaldson, 1992), illiquidity 
shocks (Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. 
Dybvig, 1983; Donaldson, 1993), or shocks 
to bank asset values when there is information 
asymmetry between bankers and depositors 
about the incidence of those shocks (Calomiris 
and Gary B. Gorton, 1991; Calomiris and 
Charles M. Kahn, 1991; Calomiris and Larry 
Schweikart, 1991; Sudipto Bhattacharya and 
Anjan V. Thakor, 1993; George G. Kaufman, 
1994). In the latter case, when depositors can- 
not observe whether individual banks are sol- 
vent, but can observe a shock that affects 
banks' portfolios, they may initiate runs on all 
banks, both solvent and insolvent. 
Bank panics are short-lived phenomena, 
historically measured in days or weeks. How- 
ever, a panic still can have important long- 
lived costs if it results in the disappearance of 
solvent banking institutions. That concern is 
often invoked to justify the significant expan- 
sion of the government safety net for U.S. 
banks during the 1930's (Anthony J. Saunders 
and Berry Wilson, 1994). In this paper, we 
take a close look at one of the clearest exam- 
ples of an asymmetric-induced bank panic dur- 
ing the Great Depression, and ask whether 
solvent banks failed during that panic. 
The answer to this question has important 
public policy implications. Studies of bank 
panics argue that panics induced by asset 
shocks and asymmetric information can be 
hard to resolve with monetary policy alone. In 
contrast, speculative attacks on the numeraire 
induced by uncertainty about its future value 
can be stopped by policies that resolve uncer- 
tainty about monetary policy (for example, by 
a devaluation, as in the United States in March 
1933). Similarly, bank panics that result from 
shocks to liquidity preference and a limited 
supply of aggregate liquid bank assets can be 
resolved by traditional monetary policy in the 
form of open-market purchases of securities 
by the central bank (Bruce Champ et al., 
1991 ). But bank panics caused by asymmetric 
information about the condition of banks 
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cannot be resolved by monetary policy. Values 
of individual bank loan portfolios (about 
which uninformed depositors are concerned) 
are not controllable by monetary policy 
(Frederic S. Mishkin, 1991; Calomiris, 1994). 
To resolve the problem of asymmetric- 
information-induced runs one must limit the 
risk depositors face as the result of asymmetric 
information, and thus remove the incentive for 
depositors to demand immediate withdrawal. 
This can either be done privately or publicly. 
Privately, banks can either act individually to 
reassure depositors or agree temporarily to 
stand behind each other's liabilities. So long 
as depositors are confident that the coalition of 
mutually insuring banks is solvent collec- 
tively, that collective action can bring the 
panic to an end without resort to suspension of 
convertibility. Alternatively, the government 
can provide insurance of deposits, either in the 
form of a commitment to pay depositors, or by 
lending cash to banks against their illiquid as- 
sets at a subsidized rate. 
This paper addresses the empirical question 
of whether private bank actions to stem 
asymmetric-information runs are adequate, or 
whether government deposit insurance is 
needed. Specifically, we ask whether private 
institutions can prevent the failure of solvent 
banks during a bank panic. We examine that 
question in the context of the banking crises 
of the Great Depression. The example we fo- 
cus on is the Chicago panic of June 1932. We 
choose this example for three reasons. First, 
we argue it is a quintessential example of an 
asymmetric-information-induced panic. Sec- 
ond, this was one of the most publicized 
examples of a run on banks during the banking 
crises of the early 1930's, which coincided 
with the federal government's decisions to es- 
tablish the public safety net for banks. Third, 
by focusing on a particular location and epi- 
sode, we are able to clearly identify the 
origins of the panic and to control for the ef- 
fects of location, time, and macroeconomic 
environment-factors that might otherwise 
complicate our analysis. 
Our strategy in the paper is as follows. We 
use a variety of measures to judge whether 
banks that failed during the Chicago panic 
were likely to have been solvent. We investi- 
gate whether they were predictably weaker ex 
ante (and thus more vulnerable to asset price 
decline) relative to banks that survived the 
panic. We employ data from individual bank 
failure experience, balance sheets, income and 
expense statements, and stock prices for fail- 
ing and surviving Chicago banks before and 
during the panic. We analyze characteristics of 
failing and surviving banks to determine 
whether the banks that failed during the panic 
were similar ex ante to those that survived the 
panic. We find that panic failures were weaker 
than panic survivors, and argue that panic fail- 
ures can be attributed to asset value decline of 
failed banks rather than to depositor confusion 
about the value of bank assets. 
While depositors did confuse panic survi- 
vors with panic failures, the failure of solvent 
banks did not result from that confusion. One 
reason such failures were avoided may be that 
solvent banks knew each other's condition bet- 
ter than depositors, and had the incentive and 
the ability to help each other avoid failure dur- 
ing the crisis. Private cooperation by the Chi- 
cago clearing house banks appears to have 
been instrumental in preventing the failure of 
at least one solvent bank during the panic. 
Section I provides historical background for 
the Chicago panic to support our use of the 
June crisis as an example of an asymmetric- 
information-induced bank panic, and our iden- 
tification of the panic event window. Section 
II presents our empirical analysis of the char- 
acteristics of panic failures, panic survivors, 
and banks that failed outside the panic win- 
dow. Section III concludes with a summary of 
our findings and a discussion of their impor- 
tance and limitations. 
I. The June 1932 Banking Crisis in Chicago 
Our discussion of the Chicago banking cri- 
sis establishes five "facts" that support its use 
for testing the value and limitations of private 
cooperation during asymmetric-information- 
induced panics. Together, these five facts es- 
tablish that the Chicago panic resulted from 
location-specific asset shocks that were rele- 
vant for bank portfolios; that it was a true 
asymmetric-information-induced panic in that 
all banks (ex post solvent and ex post insol- 
vent) experienced heavy withdrawals and 
stock price declines during the panic; that (at 
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FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF FAILED OR SUSPENDED BANKS (DAILY AND MONTHLY), JUNE 1931 -DECEMBER 1932 
Notes: Bank suspensions are from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. Bank failures consist of receiverships 
and voluntary liquidations, and come from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Statement 
Showing Total Resources and Liabilities of Illinois State Banks at the Close of Business, Superintendent of Banking of 
the State of Illinois, various issues. In order to accommodate the logarithmic scale on the right-hand side, 0. 1 is substituted 
for observed values of zero in the monthly data. 
least in one case) banks were willing to sup- 
port each other against the uninformed runs of 
depositors; and that Chicago bank failures that 
occurred outside the panic window did not co- 
incide with similar (panic) events. 
A. Was the June Crisis in Chicago 
a Unique Event Nationally? 
As Figure 1 shows, mid-to-late June of 1932 
witnessed concentration of bank failures in 
Chicago, whether measured by the number or 
total assets of failed banks.' The number of 
bank failures in June 1932 was not particularly 
high at the state, Federal Reserve District, or 
national level in comparison to previous 
months. In contrast, Chicago experienced a se- 
vere concentration of failures during the week 
of the panic. Of the 49 bank failures in the state 
of Illinois during that month, 40 took place in 
Chicago, and 26 of these failed in the week of 
June 20-27 (Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, July 2, 1932 p. 71).2 
Deposit outflows indicate a similar pattern. 
As shown in Figure 2, Chicago banks saw an 
unusually large decline in their deposits during 
' Asset plots are available from the authors upon 
request. 
2 The reported "failure dates" in the Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle of June 20-June 27 correspond to 
failure dates of June 21-June 28 reported by state and 
national bank regulators. 
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT CHANGE IN THE THREE-PERIOD MOVING AVERAGE OF TOTAL DEPOSITS, WEEKLY-REPORTING 
BANKS IN CHICAGO AND NEW YORK CITY, JUNE 1931-DECEMBER 1932 
late June, and banks in other areas of the coun- 
try (notably New York City, the financial cen- 
ter) did not share in that precipitous decline. 
B. Solvent and Insolvent Banks Both 
Suffered During the Panic 
Contemporary chroniclers and economic 
historians have pointed to the June banking 
crisis in Chicago as an important example of 
how a systemwide attack by depositors on 
banks can produce pressure on solvent and in- 
solvent banks alike. In 1932, the crisis re- 
ceived national, as well as local, attention in 
the press. Contemporary reports clearly indi- 
cate that depositors ran ex post solvent as well 
as ex post insolvent banks en masse. 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
(July 2, 1932 pp. 70-71) provided a detailed 
account of the runs on Chicago banks, and spe- 
cifically noted that even healthy banks (includ- 
ing, for example, First Chicago) were affected. 
These reports emphasized that long lines of in- 
dividual depositors formed at banks. Some 
banks that were reported to have experienced 
large withdrawals (including First Chicago and 
Continental) were able to withstand their runs 
and remain open, while other banks (including 
one Loop bank-the Chicago Bank of Com- 
merce), were forced to close. 
Initially (before June 22), bank distress was 
limited to a few banks, but this soon spread 
and was associated with a dramatic decline in 
aggregate deposits in Chicago banks. The dra- 
matic withdrawals from downtown banks be- 
gan on June 22 and reached their peak on 
Friday, June 24. F. Cyril James ( 1938 p. 1034) 
distinguishes the panic in late June from pre- 
vious periods of banking distress in Chicago: 
[previous] runs ... were directed against 
particular banks that were known to be 
enfeebled; this one was directed against 
the whole Chicago money market and 
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the First National group, in the center of 
the battle, still had more than a hundred 
and twenty-five million dollars of cash 
resources available, even though it had 
paid out fifty millions since Tuesday 
night. In the case of earlier runs, the 
crowds had been drawn from a particular 
locality or a special group: this time peo- 
ple from all parts of the city seemed to 
converge on the Loop in hysterical fear 
and anxiety. 
Bank stock prices fell during the panic, al- 
though not all Loop banks experienced large 
declines. Central Republic, First Chicago, and 
Continental were among the Loop bank survi- 
vors whose stock prices declined the most. First 
Chicago stock fell from 150 (bid) at the close 
on June 18 to a low of 131 (bid) at the close 
on June 24. Continental's stock fell from 70 
(bid) on June 18 to a low of 60 (bid) on June 
27. Central Republic saw its stock price fall 
from 52 (bid, June 18 close) to 47 (bid) on 
June 25, and then its stock plummeted to a price 
of 4 (bid) on Monday, June 27. Afterwards, its 
stock price, and those of the other surviving 
Loop banks, rebounded rapidly. The stock of 
the only Loop bank to fail during the panic, the 
Bank of Commerce, was trading at 9 (bid) on 
June 18-June 24 for a $20 par value. On June 
25 its price ceased to be reported. 
C. Local Adverse Economic News 
Precipitated the Panic 
Contemporary discussion of the crisis em- 
phasized the adverse local economic news that 
had precipitated it. The panic did not reflect ex- 
ogenous liquidity-demand shocks. Rather than 
withdrawing deposits to spend them, depositors 
often redeposited those withdrawals in their 
postal savings accounts. James (1938) argues 
that the panic was triggered by several factors, 
all of which combined in rapid succession to 
undermine depositors' faith in the value of Chi- 
cago banks' assets. The bad news included fall- 
ing prices for local utility stocks and other 
corporate assets, a well-publicized local case of 
bank fraud and mismanagement, and a munic- 
ipal revenue crisis for the city of Chicago (Chi- 
cago Tribune, June 26, 1932 p. A17). 
The city government's revenue problem 
weakened the banks in three ways. First, it 
meant that the banks were forced to bear in- 
creased risk on their bond portfolios as the 
flow of coupons was interrupted. Second, Chi- 
cago banks were called upon to purchase illiq- 
uid tax warrants to help keep the municipal 
government afloat. Third, city workers were 
forced to draw down their bank deposits to pay 
normal living expenses, thus reducing bank re- 
serves and increasing the proportion of (risky) 
loans and securities in bank portfolios. Not 
surprisingly, Chicago bankers saw the viabil- 
ity of the banking system and the financial 
problems of the city as closely related. A del- 
egation of Chicago city officials and citizens 
visiting Congress to request federal govern- 
ment assistance for the city in June 1932 
included many prominent bankers. The dele- 
gation's request for $80 million in aid was re- 
buffed by Congress on June 22 (Chicago 
Tribune, June 23, 1932 p. 1). 
The municipal revenue crisis was sympto- 
matic of the deep contraction in local asset 
prices and economic activity. Among the 
many victims was the Insull utility empire in 
Chicago, whose stock and debt were widely 
held by institutions and individual investors. 
Chicago utility companies grew dramatically 
during the 1920's in anticipation of growing 
demand and were caught short by the sudden 
decline in the local economy. The prices of 
Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) and Insull 
stocks and bonds show precipitous declines in 
the first six months of 1932. From January 
through March, Insull stock declined by 76 
percent, Insull bonds fell by 62 percent, and 
ComnEd stock lost 25 percent of its value. From 
March through early June the declines accel- 
erated. Insull debt lost 98 percent of its value, 
Insull common stock lost 89 percent, and In- 
sull preferred lost 47 percent. 
Chicago's economic problems were re- 
flected in several local financial disasters and 
cases of bank fraud (an activity traditionally 
more pronounced in bad times than in good) 
that made front-page news in Chicago day af- 
ter day just prior to the crisis.3 John Bain, a 
defendant in the most important bank fraud 
3 Milton Esbitt ( 1986) emphasizes the importance of 
management practices for explaining bank failures in Chi- 
cago in 1931. 
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case, was a local real estate developer who 
owned a chain of banks. On June 9, the 12 
banks in the chain failed to open for business 
(James, 1938 p. 1033; Elmus R. Wicker, 1993 
p. 15). Not until June 23, however, did it be- 
come clear just how large the losses from fraud 
had been in the Bain chain. On that date the 
court released its estimate that the value of the 
banks' assets was roughly $3.5 million, com- 
pared to total deposits of $13 million (Chicago 
Tribune, June 24, 1932 p. 9). 
An important additional piece of evidence 
that the panic was induced by fears of bank 
insolvency, rather than by exogenous liquidity 
demand by depositors, is that much of the 
funds withdrawn from banks were redeposited 
immediately in the form of riskless postal sav- 
ings. The Commercial and Financial Chroni- 
cle (July 2, 1932 p. 71) reports that, during 
the week of June 20-June 27, "The Postal 
Savings Department, which normally has 25 
or 30 windows in the Chicago post office ... 
increased the number to around 100 ... to ac- 
commodate deposits." That report noted that 
"... about $1,000,000 had been received [in 
postal savings on June 27], compared to 
$2,000,000 and $3,000,000 a day at [the] peak 
[of the crisis], and [compared to] a normal 
daily average of $200,000." 
In summary, by June 23, Chicago bank de- 
positors had witnessed, in a matter of only two 
weeks, the collapse of some of the largest busi- 
nesses in their city, several enormously costly 
cases of bank fraud, and a deepening of the 
municipal financial crisis as the result of the 
denial of relief to their city government by fed- 
eral authorities. All of these stories were front- 
page news day after day in the two weeks 
leading up to the banking crisis, and the news 
grew progressively worse. In this light, it is not 
surprising that depositors became increasingly 
concerned about the ability of banks to pay out 
their deposits, and transferred bank deposits to 
riskless postal savings accounts. 
D. Interbank Cooperation Helped to 
Preserve Solvent Banks Under Pressure 
As already noted, the Loop banks experi- 
enced severe stock price decline and deposit 
withdrawals during the crisis. Although two 
banks, Central Republic and the Bank of Com- 
merce, experienced unusually severe declines 
in their stock prices, the Bank of Commerce 
failed while Central Republic survived. Its sur- 
vival, however, depended on cooperation by 
large Loop banks to resolve its distress. 
During the crisis, Central Republic was 
nearly taken down by its depositors. As doubts 
about Central Republic's solvency grew and 
deposit withdrawal pressure mounted, the 
bank's management prepared to close the bank 
voluntarily to avoid the risk of its being closed 
by bank depositors. Solvent banks that had lost 
depositors' confidence had an incentive to 
close preemptively to preserve stock value by 
avoiding the costs of liquidating bank assets 
during a run, and the transaction costs asso- 
ciated with having the bank taken over by a 
regulator. This incentive was particularly 
strong in 1932, when bank stockholders faced 
the threat of double liability on deposits, which 
meant that liquidation costs borne by stock- 
holders could conceivably exceed the com- 
plete loss of the bank's capital. 
Other Chicago banks saw the prospect of Cen- 
tral Republic's voluntary liquidation as a poten- 
tial disaster for depositor confidence in their 
banks. Bankers clearly believed that depositors 
were reacting to fears of bank insolvency and 
were unable to distinguish between solvent and 
insolvent banks. Prominent bankers from Chi- 
cago and New York met as a group to devise a 
plan to defend the Central Republic Bank and 
Trust Co. from the continuing withdrawals. 
Fearing the spillover effects of a decision to liq- 
uidate Central Republic, these bankers managed 
to persuade General Dawes (its Chair) to con- 
tinue operating by offering an arrangement o 
infuse Central Republic with new liquidity. 
The initial plan for the loan to Central Re- 
public provided for $10 million in back-up li- 
quidity from New York and Chicago banks 
and $80 million from the Reconstruction Fi- 
nance Corporation (RFC), but the final deal 
involved assistance only from Chicago banks 
and the RFC. The deal that emerged combined 
liquidity assistance from the RFC with, in es- 
sence, a back-up credit enhancement by the 
Chicago banks.4 RFC liquidity support for the 
4 It is important to keep in mind that the RFC was the 
only entity charged with helping avoid the insolvency of 
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Chicago banks-like all RFC lending during 
this period-was fully collateralized by very 
high-quality, liquid assets; credit risk on the 
RFC loan to Central Republic was borne in 
largest part by the Chicago banks that formed 
the lending syndicate.5 Importantly, the RFC 
agreed to allow municipal tax warrants-$30 
million of which had been sold to Loop banks 
(Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1932 p. 6)-to 
qualify as collateral for its loan.6 Once the cri- 
sis passed, Central Republic saw its deposit 
outflows cease and its stock price increase. 
Central Republic was a solvent bank saved 
from failure by the collective intervention of 
other Loop banks. 
E. The June 20-27 Crisis 
Was a Unique Event 
Having argued that the June banking crisis 
is an example of a panic induced by asset value 
decline and asymmetric information, we turn 
to the question of whether there were other 
such episodes in Chicago during the first six 
months of 1932. That question is relevant for 
our discussion in Section II, where we will use 
the absence of panics during that period (out- 
side the window of the June crisis) as an iden- 
tifying restriction to investigate whether 
failures during the panic were similar to fail- 
ures outside of the panic. 
Bank failures during 1932, and more gen- 
erally during the Great Depression, for the 
most part have not been identified by histori- 
ans as resulting from panics or asymmetric in- 
formation. With the exception of the June 
panic, no contemporary chronicler or scholar 
of which we are aware has identified any other 
time interval during 1932 as a panic or banking 
crisis in Chicago. Neither has anyone identi- 
fied any nationwide banking panics as having 
occurred during 1932 (Milton Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963; Wicker, 1980, 1993; Ben S. 
Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris, 1993; Clifford 
Thies and Daniel Gerlowski, 1993; Eugene N. 
White, 1984). 
We have reviewed a variety of facts that 
identify the Chicago bank panic of June 1932 
as a quintessential example of an asymmetric- 
information-induced panic, resulting from lo- 
cal economic problems that affected bank 
asset values. Just as important for our pur- 
poses is the uniqueness of the panic window. 
The crisis, as reflected in sudden deposit 
withdrawals and stock price declines, and 
widespread coverage in the local and national 
press, was brief and was surrounded by times 
in which bank failures did not coincide with 
a panic. 
II. Failures and Survivors During the Panic 
We now return to our central question of 
whether the absence of government deposit in- 
surance promotes the failure of solvent banks 
during asymmetric-information-induced pan- 
ics. Specifically, we investigate whether sol- 
vent banks were able to survive withdrawal 
pressures (partly via private coordination) 
during the June 1932 Chicago bank panic. To 
answer that question we make use of the fact 
that the panic was a unique event during 1932. 
We assume that outside the panic window (in 
early 1932) banks that failed were actually in- 
solvent. We then use the characteristics of 
those nonpanic failures to evaluate the likely 
solvency or insolvency of banks that failed 
during the panic. 
If banks that failed during the panic were 
just as strong (according to some set of crite- 
ria) as those that survived during the panic, 
that would provide evidence in favor of the 
null hypothesis that confusion on the part of 
depositors about bank quality produced ran- 
dom bank failure. If, on the other hand, banks 
that failed during the panic were weaker than 
bank survivors, then panic failures cannot be 
individual banks. At this time, Federal Reserve Banks did 
not view the prevention of bank insolvency as their man- 
date. This is in sharp contrast to more recent experience 
during the 1980's. For a review of the history of Fed lend- 
ing policy, see Anna J. Schwartz ( 1992). 
5 Joseph R. Mason ( 1995) argues that prior to its use 
of preferred stock purchases to assist banks, the RFC was 
not effective in stemming bank failures. James (1938 p. 
1044) cites the view, common at the time, that because of 
the strict collateral requirements on RFC lending, RFC 
assistance often increased the credit risk faced by bank 
depositors. 
6 Abbreviated bank balance sheets were routinely re- 
ported in newspapers following call dates. Thus the June 
30 Reports of Condition published in the Chicago Tribune 
on July 2 provided further evidence of the soundness of 
Chicago banks (Chicago Tribune, pp. 18-24). 
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viewed as purely random. That implies a re- 
jection of the null hypothesis. 
It is not difficult to reject this "strong" ver- 
sion of the null hypothesis, but that does not 
prove that only insolvent banks failed during 
the panic. Depositor confusion might have pro- 
duced the failure of some solvent banks, with 
potentially large social costs, even if on average 
banks that failed during the panic were weaker 
than those that survived it. Thus in our empir- 
ical work we also address a "weak" form of 
the null hypothesis-that panic-induced fail- 
ures were not purely random, but were impor- 
tantly random. This version of the null 
hypothesis is inherently difficult to reject for- 
mally on the basis of ex ante statistical tests of 
means, medians, and regression coefficients. 
Combining these with additional evidence, 
however, we argue that the social costs of the 
unwarranted closure of solvent institutions (if 
any) must have been very small. 
Our empirical discussion divides into two 
parts. First, in subsection A we present evi- 
dence that leads to the rejection of the strong 
form of the null hypothesis. Then we confront 
and reject the weak form of the null hypothe- 
sis, using statistical evidence as well as infor- 
mation from bank examiner reports. 
A. Comparisons of Bank Attributes 
Leading Up to the Panic 
We divide the Chicago banks in our sample 
into three groups: panic failures (banks that 
failed during the panic, June 20-27), non- 
panic failures (banks that failed at other 
dates), and survivors (banks that did not fail 
in the first seven months of 1932). We then 
compare the ex ante attributes of these three 
groups. 
In our analysis of survivors, panic failures, 
and nonpanic failures, we focus on four ex 
ante measures of bank condition: (1) the ratio 
of the market value of equity to the book value 
of equity; (2) the estimated probability of fail- 
ure of banks; (3) the rate of decline in bank 
deposits; and (4) the interest paid on bank 
debts. These various measures of bank risk are 
available for different subsets of Chicago 
banks, depending on the availability of data on 
stock prices and interest paid on deposits. 
Stock prices are not available for all Chicago 
banks, and interest paid is only available for 
Fed member banks. The data set for the study 
consists of several components: balance sheet 
data, income and expense data, and stock price 
data. Balance sheet data from December 31, 
1931 call reports were collected for all state 
and national banks in Chicago, a total of 123 
banks. Total assets and total deposits were also 
collected for December 31, 1930, to permit 
calculation of the changes in those variables 
during 1931. Balance sheet data for the 22 na- 
tional banks and 11 state banks that were 
members of the Federal Reserve System come 
from microfilm of the original Reports of Con- 
dition filed with the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) and the Board of Gov- 
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. State 
nonmember bank balance sheet data are from 
the compilation of Statements of State Banks 
of Illinois issued by the Superintendent of 
Banking of the State of Illinois. The disaggre- 
gated Reports of Condition of member banks 
facilitated aggregation of balance sheet cate- 
gories to reporting standards comparable with 
the Statements of State Banks of Illinois. The 
stock prices for Chicago banks are end-of- 
month observations published in the Bank and 
Quotation Record (of the Commercial and Fi- 
nancial Chronicle). Interest payments are 
available only for Fed member banks (from 
the Reports of Condition). 
1. Market-to-Book Value Ratios. Figure 3 
plots the means and 50-percent inclusion 
ranges for market-to-book value ratios for the 
three separate groups of Chicago banks (sur- 
vivors, panic failures, and nonpanic failures). 
To adjust for survivorship bias in plotting 
these trends, we retain failed banks in our sam- 
ple after their date of failure, and assume that 
their stock value after failure is zero. 
The striking fact illustrated by Figure 3 is 
that as early as January 1931 the banks that 
7The dates we choose for the panic window are con- 
sistent with James's (1938) discussion, newspaper ac- 
counts of the beginning and end of the panic, and the daily 
movements of the stock prices of the ten Loop banks re- 
ported in the Chicago Tribune, which reached their nadir 
on June 27. The results are robust to reasonable alternative 
definitions of the panic window. 
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Notes: Survivorship bias can arise if banks that fail are excluded from subsequent means and standard deviations. We 
correct for this bias by including failed banks and assuming they had zero market value of equity after the date of failure. 
survived the June panic appeared to be a dis- 
tinct group with higher average market-to- 
book ratios. The banks that failed during the 
panic generally had slightly higher average ra- 
tios than those that failed at other times, but 
throughout the prepanic period (January 1, 
1931-June 20, 1932) the market-to-book 
value ratios of panic failures were very close 
on average to those of prepanic failures and 
very different from those of panic survivors. 
By January 1932, most of the panic failures 
had market-to-book ratios less than unity. Fig- 
ure 3 shows that all Chicago banks suffered 
from capital decline during 1931 and 1932, 
and that the banks that failed during the June 
panic reached and maintained unusually low 
market-to-book value ratios long before the 
panic. 
2. Failure Predictions. Next, we use ex ante 
observable characteristics of Chicago banks 
(based on bank data reported in December 
1931) to compute scores predicting failure 
during the first seven months of 1932. We 
compare the probabilities of failure for the 
three groups of banks (panic failures, non- 
panic failures, and survivors). Our ex ante 
scores indicate that panic failures and non- 
panic failures on average were weaker banks 
than survivors at least as early as the end of 
1931. 
We estimate the probability of failure using 
a logit model of the links between bank char- 
acteristics (e.g., balance sheet ratios) and bank 
failure. The danger of using ex post failures to 
estimate failure risk, of course, is that special 
events with low probabilities may have influ- 
enced actual failure experience during the panic 
in ways that were unpredictable ex ante and 
possibly unrelated to underlying insolvency. 
For example, if a panic were a common shock 
to all banks, then the level of reserves might do 
an excellent job of forecasting panic failures 
even if the banks that failed during the panic 
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did not have higher ex ante probabilities of fail- 
ing. Thus using ex post panic failures to con- 
struct a model of ex ante bank weakness may 
bias toward identifying panic failures as inher- 
ently weak when in fact they were not. To avoid 
(or at least minimize) this problem, we report 
logit failure forecasts constructed from both in- 
sample and out-of-sample estimation.8 In the 
out-of-sample forecasts, we exclude banks that 
failed during the panic from the sample when 
we estimate the coefficients relating bank char- 
acteristics to the probability of failure. This 
constrains the panic failures to be predicted us- 
ing model parameters that were constructed to 
explain nonpanic failures, and thus prevents 
special unpredictable events during the panic 
from influencing predictions of failure. 
Our logit results are reported in Table 1. We 
include the following variables (all measured 
at year-end 1931) in our specification: size 
(log of total assets), the reserve-to-demand 
deposit ratio (where reserve assets are defined 
as cash and government securities), the real 
estate loan share (defined as the ratio of loans 
on real estate to total loans), the ratio of real 
estate owned to illiquid assets (which mainly 
includes repossessed real estate collateral, and 
excludes bank premises), the ratio of last 
year's retained earnings to net worth, and the 
long-term debt ratio (bills payable plus redis- 
counts plus time deposits, divided by total 
assets). 
This combination of variables also forms the 
basis of the logit models of White (1984), 
David C. Wheelock (1992), Calomiris and 
Wheelock (1995), and Mason (1995), all of 
which are used to forecast bank failures for the 
1920's and 1930's. This specification typically 
is interpreted as capturing measures of each of 
the following fundamental bank characteris- 
tics: bank size, asset liquidity, exposure to real 
estate market risk, nonperforming loans (real 
estate owned), recent bank performance (re- 
tained earnings/net worth), and bank liability 
composition. Bank liability composition is a 
useful signal of weakness because-as White 
(1984), Wheelock (1992), Calomiris and 
Wheelock (1995), and Mason (1995) 
argue-reliance on high-interest, borrowed 
funds was an undesirable necessity only suf- 
fered by higher-risk banks (see also our dis- 
cussion of debt composition below). While 
not all variables prove significant in our logits, 
we retain measures of the basic concepts that 
previous studies have found to be important 
even if they do not prove statistically signifi- 
cant in our sample. Excluding them would not 
affect our results. We also experimented with 
including two other variables (not reported in 
Table 1 ): the ratio of book net worth to assets 
and the percent changes in deposits or assets 
of banks from December 1930 to December 
1931. In neither case did the regressors add 
predictive power to our models. 
The results in Table 1 are quite similar for 
the in-sample and out-of-sample specifications, 
which is consistent with the view that failures 
during panics were similar events to nonpanic 
failures. The variable coefficients that are sig- 
nificant are of the expected signs. Banks with 
higher reserve ratios, higher ratios of retained 
earnings to net worth, and lower proportions of 
long-term debt were less likely to fail. 
Table 2 reports the mean and median pre- 
dicted failure probabilities for the logit models 
by category of bank (panic failure, nonpanic 
failure, and survivor), and the significance lev- 
els for tests of differences across categories in 
means and medians. These results indicate that 
the banks that failed during the panic were less 
risky ex ante than banks that failed outside the 
panic and more risky than survivors. Compar- 
isons using predicted values from in-sample 
and out-of-sample regressions are similar. By 
construction, the in-sample results show less of 
a difference between panic and nonpanic fail- 
ures. Also by construction, out-of-sample fore- 
casts tend to have lower probabilities of failure. 
Our results are consistent with the notions that 
panic failures were much weaker banks than 
panic survivors, and that failures during the 
panic were a continuation of the same process 
that underlay other failures. 
3. Deposit Withdrawals and Debt Composi- 
tion. If panic failures had been relatively weak 
8 We also estimated logit models for prepanic failures 
only (excluding the failures that occurred during or after 
the panic). The results were essentially identical to those 
we report below for nonpanic failures (which include fail- 
ures that occurred after the panic), and so we do not report 
them here. 
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TABLE 1-LOGIT MODEL RESULTS 
Out-of-sample In-sample 
Dependent variable of all models: Bank failure N[0, 1] used for significance levels 
Number of observations 86 114 
Number of panic failures 0 28 
Number of nonpanic failures 18 18 
Log-likelihood -18.95 -51.37 
Restricted (slopes = 0) log-likelihood -44.12 -76.88 
Chi-squared statistic (k - 1 df) 50.34 51.03 
Significance level 3.38E-09 2.28E-09 
Variable name Coefficient Coefficient 
Standard Standard 
error error 
Constant 3.31 1.49 
7.40 3.73 
Bank size (log of total assets) -0.75* -0.20 
0.54 0.25 
Ratio of reserves to demand deposits -4.47*** -2.97*** 
1.81 0.83 
Real estate loan share 2.10 -1.39 
2.78 1.71 
Ratio of other real estate owned to illiquid assets 13.89 2.09 
12.16 8.25 
Ratio of net earnings to net worth -25.33*** - 15.20*** 
10.27 5.30 
Long-term debt 23.31*** 12.05*** 
6.48 2.64 
* Statistical significance at a = 0.10. 
** Statistical significance at a = 0.05. 
*** Statistical significance at a = 0.01. 
institutions for months prior to the panic, then 
they should have experienced larger rates of 
depositor withdrawal before the panic. It is not 
possible to obtain comparable records of de- 
posit accounts for failed banks after the De- 
cember 1931 call, but one can ask whether 
panic failures experienced relatively large de- 
posit withdrawals from December 1930 to De- 
cember 1931. Table 3 reports data on the rate 
of decline of deposits over that year. Clearly, 
panic failures and nonpanic failures experi- 
enced much larger withdrawals than survivors 
in 1931. Panic survivors experienced an av- 
erage decline in deposits of 41 percent, com- 
pared to 55 percent for nonpanic failures, and 
33 percent for survivors. 
The higher rate of decline in deposits for 
panic failures and nonpanic failures during 
1931 is reflected in the debt compositions of 
those banks. Detailed data on the composition 
of bank liabilities are available for all banks in 
our sample, either from Federal Reserve or 
state call reports. Table 3 presents data on the 
liability composition of banks as of December 
1931. 
Interestingly, the shares of the various debt 
categories vary systematically across the three 
groups of banks. In particular, panic failures 
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TABLE 2-MEANS AND MEDIANS OF FAILURE PROBABILITIES, BY CLASS OF BANK 
In-sample logit Out-of-sample logit 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Nonpanic failures 
Score 0.753 0.796 0.669 0.780 
Standard error 0.042 0.033 0.068 0.053 
Number 18 18 18 18 
Panic failures 
Score 0.556 0.625 0.269 0.166 
Standard error 0.043 0.059 0.055 0.106 
Number 28 28 28 28 
Survivors 
Score 0.248 0.187 0.088 0.005 
Standard error 0.030 0.055 0.021 0.015 
Number 68 68 68 68 
t-statistics for tests of differences 
Panic, survivors 5.66*** 4.67*** 3.75*** 2.25*** 
Panic, nonpanic 3.11*** 2.19** 4.57*** 4.42*** 
Nonpanic, survivors 8.13*** 5.61*** 10.78*** 19.32*** 
* Significant at a = 0.10. 
** Significant at a = 0.05. 
*** Significant at a = 0.01. 
(like nonpanic failures) tend to rely much 
more on borrowed money (defined as bills 
payable and rediscounts). As we have noted 
above, the standard interpretation of this 
finding-which is consistent with observed 
differences in deposit withdrawal rates across 
categories during 1931 reported in these 
tables -is that when demandable debt is with- 
drawn from risky banks, those banks are 
forced to rely on high-cost borrowed money, 
typically collateralizeq by liquid bank assets. 
As noted above, other studies have found that 
the share of borrowed money is a reliable pre- 
dictor of bank failure during the 1920's 
and 1930's (White, 1984; Wheelock, 1992; 
Calomiris and Wheelock, 1995; Mason, 
1995). Moreover, examiners from the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency used a re- 
liance on borrowed money as a clear indica- 
tion that a bank was having trouble. For 
example, in referring to the trouble at the Hyde 
Park-Kenwood National Bank, the examiner 
wrote that: "... practically all of the bank's 
bonds and securities are pledged [as collateral 
for borrowed money] and the bank is now a 
heavy borrower, the Chief Examiner advising 
that the total borrowings on January 28 
amounted to $684,000 due to the heavy de- 
cline in deposits." 
In summary, panic failures and nonpanic fail- 
ures experienced significantly larger withdraw- 
als of deposits long before the panic. Consistent 
with this deposit withdrawal pressure, panic 
and nonpanic failures alike experienced fun- 
damental debt financing reallocations charac- 
teristic of troubled institutions. 
4. Interest Rates on Debt. Interest rates on 
debt should indicate debtholders' perceptions 
of the risk of bank failure. If panic failures and 
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TABLE 3-DEPOSIT AND INTEREST RATE COMPOSITION, BY CLASS OF BANK 
Change Change 
in in Interest 
total total Demand Due to Time Borrowed on total 
deposits assets deposits banks deposits money debt 
Survivors 
Mean -0.3251 -0.2145 0.5098 0.0301 0.4600 0.0197 0.0062 
Standard error 0.0363 0.0491 0.0226 0.0078 0.0245 0.0070 0.0005 
Number of obs. 62 63 68 68 68 68 18 
Panic failures 
Mean -0.4115 -0.3397 0.4911 0.0216 0.4873 0.0831 0.0093 
Standard error 0.0595 0.0299 0.0314 0.0058 0.0315 0.0159 0.0009 
Number of obs. 28 28 28 28 28 28 11 
Nonpanic failures 
Mean -0.5514 -0.3979 0.3835 0.0053 0.6113 0.1872 0.0116 
Standard error 0.0316 0.0242 0.0336 0.0029 0.0325 0.0301 0.0014 
Number of obs. 18 18 18 18 18 18 3 
Tests of differences between means (t-statistics) 
Nonpanic, panic 1.777** 1.381* 2.263*** 2.131** 2.629*** 3.338*** 1.161 
Panic, survivor 1.287* 1.637* 0.461 0.667 0.630 4.249*** 3.386*** 
Nonpanic, 
survivor 3.245*** 1.971** 2.672*** 1.618* 2.99*** 8.192*** 4.201*** 
Notes: Deposits are presented as a proportion of total deposits, equal to demand deposits, interbank deposits, time deposits, 
and bills payable and rediscounts. Interest is reported as interest expense as a proportion of the relevant deposit category, 
i.e., demand deposit interest expense/demand deposits. Interest is calculated as the amount of interest paid over the last 
six months as a proportion of the total in each category of debt as of December 31, 1931. Changes in total assets and 
deposits are from December 31, 1930 to December 31, 1931. 
* Significant at a = 0.10. 
** Significant at a = 0.05. 
*** Significant at a = 0.01. 
nonpanic failures were more likely to fail ex 
ante they should have been forced to pay 
higher interest on their debt prior to the June 
panic. For a small sample of Chicago banks 
(31 ) that were Fed members, we have data on 
the interest paid during the last six months of 
1931 on each of the categories of debt dis- 
cussed above (individual demand deposits, 
bank deposits, time deposits, and borrowed 
money). We report the aggregate amounts of 
these in Table 3 as a fraction of the respective 
outstanding debts shown on the December 31, 
1931 balance sheets. The banks are grouped, 
as before, according to their failure experi- 
ence. It is important o keep in mind that our 
reported interest rate differences capture the 
experience of only a small sample of banks, 
and are measured with error because we divide 
interest flows over a six-month period by end- 
of-year balances. Therefore, these data may 
not provide an entirely accurate picture of in- 
terest rates paid as of December 1931. 
In the column entitled interest paid on total 
debt we compute the means for each of the 
three categories of banks of the ratio of total 
interest paid relative to total debt. We find that 
panic failures and nonpanic failures paid sig- 
nificantly higher interest rates on debt than 
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survivors. Panic failures paid an overall inter- 
est cost that was 50 percent higher than that of 
survivors, and nonpanic failures paid nearly 
double the interest rate paid by survivors.9 
In summary, we find that panic failures and 
nonpanic failures paid higher interest rates on 
their debt than survivors. The higher interest 
paid by those two classes of banks reflected 
their relative reliance on high-cost funds (bor- 
rowed money and time deposits) rather than 
higher interest costs on demand debt. 
B. The Role of Declining Asset Values 
in Chicago Bank Failures 
The fact that panic failures appear to have 
been stronger institutions on average than non- 
panic failures, as measured by their publicly 
available financial data as of the end of 1931, 
has several possible explanations. One possibil- 
ity is the weak form of the null hypothesis (that 
a significant number of solvent banks failed dur- 
ing the panic). If one believed that bank char- 
acteristics (as measured in December 1931) 
accurately reflect unchanging cross-sectional 
differences in bank condition throughout the pe- 
riod January-July 1932, then panic failures con- 
sequently appear excessive. That is, under the 
assumption of unchanging bank condition, the 
fact that panic failures' characteristics lie be- 
tween those of nonpanic failures and those of 
survivors implies that the failure process was 
less discriminating during the panic-that is, 
that the traits of panic failures reflect a mix of 
solvent and insolvent institutions. 
But such an assumption is surely incorrect. 
In Section I we presented evidence that local 
asset values (and the value of bank portfolios) 
declined dramatically in the first half of 1932. 
This implies that the failure threshold for 
banks was shifting over that period. In an en- 
vironment of persistently declining asset 
prices, the first banks to fail (nonpanic fail- 
ures) will appear measurably weaker than 
banks that fail only after asset values have 
fallen much more (panic failures). To control 
for changes in the probability of failure within 
our period, we estimate a survival duration 
model of bank failure. This model supports the 
argument that declining fundamentals can ex- 
plain the quality difference between (early) 
nonpanic failures and (late) panic failures. 
Our survival duration model is similar to our 
logit model except that it forecasts the length 
of time the bank will survive (measured in 
days after December 31, 1931 ), and allows for 
changes in the underlying transition probabil- 
ities during our period, i.e., the conditional 
probabilities of failure on any given day, via 
a logistic hazard function. This hazard func- 
tion effectively separates the effects of 
changes in the probability of failure across in- 
dividuals from shifts in the baseline probabil- 
ity of failure associated with diminishing 
fundamental bank asset prices (Guido W. 
Imbens, 1994 p. 703). The implied baseline 
probability of failure estimated in our model 
increases at a decreasing rate from January to 
June, and declines during July. A technical 
Appendix, available from the authors upon re- 
quest, provides a formal discussion of our sur- 
vival duration model. 
The results of our survival duration model 
are reported in Table 4. The results are quali- 
tatively similar to those for the logit model in 
Table 1, although, of course, coefficients in the 
two models are of opposite sign. As shown in 
Table 4, our survival duration model is capable 
of approximating the gaps in time between 
nonpanic failures and panic failures. Table 5 
illustrates that the model overpredicts survival 
duration on average for both panic failures and 
nonpanic failures. That is, using the same scor- 
9 We also examined the breakdown of interest paid ac- 
cording to each category of debt. Differences in total de- 
posit risk show up in withdrawals of demand deposits 
from banks, in changes in relative weights attached to var- 
ious types of debt, and in overall debt costs, but not in 
demand deposit interest rate differences. Other research 
examining links between bank-failure risk and demand de- 
posit interest rates during the Great Depression has also 
failed to find a positive relationship between demand de- 
posit interest rates and bank-failure risk. George J. 
Benston (1964) analyzed banks during the period 1929- 
1935 and found no significant positive relationship be- 
tween demand deposit interest rates and failure risk. As in 
our sample, he sometimes found a negative (and insignif- 
icant) relationship between the two. One explanation for 
these findings is provided by Gary B. Gorton and George 
G. Pennacchi (1990), who argue that some bank deposi- 
tors may be very unwilling to accept increased risk on their 
accounts. Risk-intolerant depositors may prefer to adjust 
to changes in bank riskiness via changes in the quantity 
of balances they hold with a bank rather than changes in 
the interest paid on those balances. 
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TABLE 4-SURVIVAL MODEL RESULTS 
Out-of-sample In-sample 
Dependent variable: Log of time elapsed (in days) from December 31, 1931 
Number of observations 86 114 
Number of panic failures 0 28 
Number of nonpanic failures 18 18 
Log-likelihood -39.32 -84.36 
Restricted (slopes = 0) log-likelihood -67.08 -117.30 
Chi-squared statistic (k - 1 df) 55.51 65.88 
Significance level 3.65E-10 2.85E-12 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Variable name Standard error Standard error 
Constant 1.77 4.53*** 
5.21 1.76 
Bank size (log of total assets) 0.53 0.13 
0.42 0.12 
Ratio of reserves to demand deposits 2.69*** 1.44*** 
0.98 0.39 
Real estate loan share -0.61 0.58 
1.62 0.72 
Ratio of other real estate owned to illiquid assets -4.95 0.04 
7.29 3.33 
Ratio of net earnings to net worth 10.52** 7.41*** 
607 2.40 
Long-term debt -12.15*** -5.80*** 
3.63 1.10 
* Statistical significance at a = 0.10. 
** Statistical significance at a = 0.05. 
*** Statistical significance at a = 0.01. 
ing model (based on December 1931 charac- 
teristics), and allowing for time variation in 
the hazard function, we estimate mean sur- 
vival duration for nonpanic failures of 192 
days, compared to 349 days for panic failures, 
while the actual respective survival means 
were 107 and 177 days. But the model accu- 
rately estimates the relative health of panic and 
nonpanic failures. Our model predicts that 
nonpanic failures survive (on average) 60 per- 
cent as long as panic failures, and in fact they 
averaged 55 percent of the survival time of 
panic failures. Thus our model does not un- 
derpredict panic failures relative to nonpanic 
failures, as one would expect if panic failures 
were unwarranted and nonpanic failures were 
warranted. In other words, when one accounts 
for the time-varying probability of failure for 
all banks, the model does as well estimating 
cross-sectional hazards during the panic as 
prior to the panic. 
C. Further Evidence the Panic Entailed 
Low Social Costs 
The duration survival model results are 
consistent with the view that only observa- 
bly insolvent banks failed during the panic. 
But these findings do not constitute a formal 
rejection of the weak form of the null 
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TABLE 5-MEANS AND MEDIANS OF DURATION PREDICTIONS 
(IN DAYS FROM DECEMBER 31, 1931), BY CLASS OF BANK 
In-sample duration Actual duration 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Nonpanic failures 
Score 192 168 107 131 
Standard error 24 25 NA NA 
Number 18 18 18 18 
Panic failures 
Score 349 253 177 177 
Standard error 49 38 NA NA 
Number 28 28 28 28 
Survivors 
Score 1,482 688 NA NA 
Standard error 308 99 NA NA 
Number 68 68 68 68 
t-statistics for tests of differences 
Panic, survivors 2.35*** 2.78*** NA NA 
Panic, nonpanic 2.46*** 1.66** NA NA 
Nonpanic, survivors 2.15** 2.69*** NA NA 
* Significant at a = 0.10. 
** Significant at a = 0.05. 
Significant at a = 0.01. 
hypothesis-that some solvent banks failed 
during the panic, and that the social costs 
from these failures were important. To in- 
vestigate that possibility, we take a closer 
look at panic failures, particularly at "out- 
liers" that appear (on the basis of observable 
traits in December 1931) to have been 
healthy institutions. Examination reports on 
the condition of these outliers reveal deep 
problems in these institutions prior to the 
panic, which were publicly known but not 
captured by 1931 balance sheet ratios. In 
many cases, bank fraud and accounting ir- 
regularities explain why banks that failed 
during the panic appear stronger statistically 
(on the basis of 1931 accounting data) than 
they did to contemporaries, for whom their 
problems were common knowledge by mid- 
1932. 
Table 6 presents data on the distributions of 
logit scores for the three groups of banks using 
in-sample and out-of-sample estimation. Note 
that none of the panic failures has an out-of- 
sample score that is as low (that is, as good) as 
the top quartile of survivors. The minimum 
(best) out-of-sample score of the panic failures 
is 0.00059, and the cutoff for the lowest (best) 
quartile of survivors is 0.00025. Only six panic 
failures had out-of-sample logit scores that were 
lower than or equal to the median of survivors. 
Were these six panic failures examples of 
banks that were solvent but allowed to fail by 
their fellow bankers? If so, were the social 
costs of those failures high? It is easier to an- 
swer the second question. These six banks col- 
lectively represented a trivial proportion of the 
bank assets of Chicago ( 1.2 percent of total 
assets as of December 1931), and while it is 
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TABLE 6-DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF LOGIT SCORES FOR Ex POST PANIC FAILURES AND SURVIVORS 
Percent of survivors Percent of survivors 
estimated below estimated below 
In-sample p(fail), that probability Out-of-sample p(fail), that probability 
panic failures (in-sample logit) panic failures (out-of-sample logit) 
Minimum 0.048 0.311 0.001 0.326 
25th percentile 0.448 0.782 0.038 0.697 
Median 0.626 0.910 0.175 0.832 
75th percentile 0.701 0.932 0.469 0.929 
Maximum 0.905 0.988 0.906 1.000 
Percent of panic failures Percent of panic failures 
estimated below estimated below 
In-sample p(fail), that probability Out-of-sample p(fail), that probability 
survivors (in-sample logit) survivors (out-of-sample logit) 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25th percentile 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Median 0.162 0.038 0.006 0.139 
75th percentile 0.403 0.222 0.074 0.300 
Maximum 0.943 1.000 0.821 0.918 
conceivable that some of them were solvent 
banks, the social costs of their demise cannot 
have been very large. 
To answer the first question we explored the 
specific circumstances of these six panic fail- 
ures and their financial condition prior to fail- 
ure. We searched the records of the OCC for 
any relevant examinations and correspondence 
with respect to the two national banks included 
in the group of six (South Ashland National 
Bank and Standard National Bank). We were 
able to locate information about both of these 
banks. Prior to the panic, both of these banks 
had experienced large loan losses and were un- 
der investigation by the U.S. Attorney General 
and the OCC for fraud. 
The records we discovered for South Ash- 
land clearly indicate that this bank was on the 
verge of failure at least two months prior to 
the panic, and possibly earlier. While the bank 
was closed on June 24 and placed in the hands 
of a receiver on June 27, South Ashland's Vice 
President, Guy Brown, had written to the OCC 
as early as June 2 to announce that the bank 
had decided on May 25 to liquidate itself in 
response to an April 27 examination by the 
Comptroller's office. That examination re- 
vealed that the bank had experienced large un- 
accounted losses that left its capital impaired, 
and placed it in violation of its charter. The 
Deputy Comptroller wrote that "the officers 
and directors have been operating the bank 
along unsound lines." In particular, the Dep- 
uty Comptroller criticized the bank's manage- 
ment for allowing a large loan to the bank's 
Director/Manager that produced an enormous 
loss for the bank. The examiner, in his May 5 
letter to the OCC, wrote: "This bank is now 
under the incompetent management of Direc- 
tor James G. Hodgkinson, who dominates the 
policies; he is absolutely broke and the manner 
in which he has furthered his own interests is 
most reprehensible. A report on his operations 
has been made to the United States District 
Attorney." The details of the examination re- 
veal fraudulent activities, including check kit- 
ing by Hodgkinson. 
Standard National Bank was also involved 
in a case of fraud. Its Vice President, who was 
also the Vice President of another bank that 
failed during the panic (People's National 
Bank and Trust Co.) confessed to appropriating 
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bank funds to finance his speculation in the 
stock market. The individual and the two 
banks were all under investigation by the 
OCC and the U.S. Attorney General as early 
as October 1931. 
South Ashland and Standard are interesting 
examples of banks whose accounts as of De- 
cember 1931 do not provide pictures of their 
true position prior to the panic. While their 
scores in our models are very strong, their 
condition according to the examiners was ex- 
tremely weak. It is possible that some or all 
of the four state bank outliers may be expli- 
cable in similar terms. After all, if the strength 
of a six-month-old balance sheet were enough 
to conclusively indicate a bank's strength, 
asymmetric-information panics could never 
occur. 
The Comptroller's examination reports indi- 
cate that information about fraud and risk taking 
by banks that failed during the panic surfaced 
between December 1931 and April 1932. 
Clearly, investors in bank stock detected special 
problems in the banks that failed during the 
panic in those same months. As Figure 1 shows, 
the market-to-book value ratios for panic failures 
fell sharply from January through April 1932. 
The market-to-book ratio of surviving banks did 
not decline nearly as precipitously. 
The wealth of OCC file material we discov- 
ered led us to search for the examination rec- 
ords of the other national banks in our sample 
that failed during the June panic. It is difficult 
to quantify the statements of examiners (to 
convert them to scores), but it is easy to sum- 
marize their content. We were able to locate 
information for all but one of the other national 
banks that failed during the panic. In every 
case for which we have records, the bank ex- 
aminers had indicated extreme problems at the 
bank at least as early as the end of April 1932. 
Following are excerpts from (or synopses of) 
the examiner's remarks about each of these 
banks: 
(1) Jackson Park National Bank (Unpub- 
lished examination report, April 27, 
1932): "... the condition of this institu- 
tion remains highly unsatisfactory from 
every angle. It will be noted criticized as- 
sets have increased materially since last 
examination." 
(2) National Bank of Woodlawn (Unpub- 
lished examination report, April 25, 
1932): "The report of an examination ... 
completed April 25 ... shows a bond de- 
preciation ... which greatly exceeds the 
bank's entire capital, surplus, and undi- 
vided profits ...." 
(3) Bowmanville National Bank (Unpub- 
lished examination report, Letter of April 
6, 1932): "The report of the examination 
... completed February 25 shows such an 
unsatisfactory condition it is requested 
that you hold a meeting with the directors 
or a committee thereof and ascertain 
whether or not something further can be 
done to strengthen the bank, after which 
this office would be advised fully of the 
conclusions reached ... the solvency of 
[the bank] is questioned in view of the 
doubtful and loss items and the bond 
depreciation." 
(4) Midland National Bank (Unpublished ex- 
amination report, April 27, 1932): "This 
little institution is struggling along prob- 
ably as best as could be expected under 
the circumstances ... Loss of $1,000,000 
in deposits within a year has just about 
taken away earning capacity." "The re- 
port ... shows a bond depreciation of 
$162,004 and losses of $16,041 in loans, 
which consume the surplus fund, undi- 
vided profits and reserve for contingen- 
cies and impair the bank's capital to the 
extent of $67,414." 
(5) Hyde Park-Kenwood National Bank (Un- 
published examination report, February 
10, 1932): "The report of an examination 
of your bank completed December 28 ... 
shows an exceedingly unsatisfactory con- 
dition and that you are confronted with a 
serious situation. This conclusion is based 
upon the slow and doubtful assets ... 
shown in the report; the fact that practi- 
cally all of the bank's bonds and securities 
are pledged and the bank is now a heavy 
borrower, the Chief Examiner advising 
that the total borrowings on January 28 
amounted to $684,000 due to the heavy 
decline in deposits." 
(6) Ravenswood National Bank (Unpub- 
lished examination report, April 18, 
1932): "The report of an examination of 
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your bank completed April 18 ... dis- 
closes several unsatisfactory conditions 
as set out by the examiner throughout the 
report and itemized on page 11, the cor- 
rection of which should be effected as 
rapidly as possible. The report shows a 
high percentage of the bank's loans to be 
in very unsatisfactory condition ... ." By 
May 9, accounting fraud was also dis- 
covered to have taken place by a former 
employee. 
These qualitative statements about national 
banks that failed during the panic reinforce the 
evidence from Tables 2 and 3 that panic fail- 
ures were among the weakest banks in the sys- 
tem at the time of the panic.'0 
III. Conclusion 
We have compared the attributes of banks 
that failed during the Chicago panic of June 
1932 to those of banks that failed at other 
times in early 1932, and those of banks that 
survived the period using a variety of stan- 
dards of comparison. Comparisons of the 
market-to-book value of equity, the estimated 
probability of failure or duration of survival, 
the rates of withdrawal of debt during 1931, 
and the interest rates paid on borrowed money 
lead to the same conclusion: failures of banks 
during the panic reflected the continuation of 
the same process that produced failures before 
the panic. The special attributes of failing 
banks are distinguishable months before the 
panic and were reflected in stock prices, failure 
probabilities, the opinions of bank examiners, 
debt composition, and interest rates. 
We conclude that failures during the panic 
reflected the relative weakness of failing banks 
in the face of a common asset value shock 
rather than contagion. The panic was precipi- 
tated by exogenous asset-price decline, and the 
banks that failed during the panic were among 
the weakest banks in the city. While asym- 
metric information between depositors and 
banks precipitated a general run on banks, our 
evidence suggests that this asymmetric- 
information problem did not produce failures 
of solvent banks. 
If the risk of solvent banks failing during an 
asymmetric-information panic is not high (as 
the evidence from the Chicago panic sug- 
gests), that could have important implications 
for bank regulatory policy. Deposit insurance 
and government assistance to banks since the 
Depression have been motivated in part by the 
perception that bank failures during the De- 
pression were a consequence of contagion, 
rather than the insolvency of individual banks. 
If private interbank cooperation, buttressed by 
liquidity assistance from the monetary author- 
ity (like the assistance provided by the RFC 
to the Chicago clearinghouse), are adequate to 
preserve systemic stability, then a far less am- 
bitious federal safety net might be desirable 
(Calomiris, 1990). 
Our findings lend support o James's ( 1938) 
account of the role of interbank cooperation in 
mitigating the costs of the banking crisis. The 
limited duration and costs of contagion may 
have reflected the cooperative intervention by 
the Chicago clearinghouse, which used its liq- 
uid assets to protect at least one solvent bank 
from unwarranted attack until the runs by un- 
informed depositors ubsided. Absent such co- 
operation, the failure experience during the 
panic of June 1932 could have been very dif- 
ferent. Our evidence suggests, somewhat con- 
trary to the portrayals in Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) and Bernanke (1983), that 
clearinghouses continued to serve an impor- 
tant function during the Great Depression, and 
did not see the Fed or the RFC as "reliev [ing] 
them of the responsibility of fighting runs" 
(Bernanke, 1983 p. 260). How far can one 
generalize from these conclusions? Was the 
Chicago panic of June 1932 representative of 
10 The Chicago Bank of Commerce, the largest bank to 
fail during the panic and the only Chicago Loop bank to 
fail, had an estimated probability of failure of 0.00572 in 
the out-of-sample logit, and an estimated probability of 
failure of 0.448 in the in-sample logit. Four panic failures 
had lower out-of-sample estimated probabilities of failure 
than the Chicago Bank of Commerce, and seven panic 
failures had lower in-sample estimated probabilities of 
failure. The panic failures with lower estimated failure 
probabilities (for which we have examination reports) 
were viewed as severely troubled banks by examiners. 
While it is not possible to determine whether the Bank of 
Commerce was solvent or insolvent during the panic using 
its logit or survival scores alone, we are able to say that 
its scores were not unusual relative to panic failures that 
were perceived by examiners as troubled institutions. 
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other banking panics during the Great Depres- 
sion? Because panics and waves of bank fail- 
ure were scattered across time and location 
during the Great Depression, we believe an- 
swering that question will require analysis of 
other local panics, using detailed bank-level 
data similar to those we have analyzed for the 
Chicago panic. Defining and analyzing those 
events is an important area for future research 
on the causes of bank failures during the 
Depression. 
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